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BOOK REVIEWS

Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, by William Lane Craig and

Quentin Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Pp. x and 342. $45.00 (Cloth)
GRAHAM OPPY, Australian National University
Recent scientific research into the cosmological origins of the universe has
prompted a flood of philosophical speculations about the consequences of
that research for views which invoke supernatural causes for the existence
of the universe. Much of this speculation has come from people whose primary training is not philosophical; in particular, much of it has come from
the same physicists who are engaged in the scientific research in question.
Moreover, much of the scientific research in question is inseparably bound
up with certain kinds of speculations which not-too-distant previous generations would have considered to be solely the province of philosophers. A
brief glance at the "Popular Science" section of any reasonable bookshop
will confirm that not only Stephen Hawking, Paul Davies, Roger Penrose,
John Barrow, Frank Tipler, Joseph Silk, Steven Weinberg, John Gribbin and
Freeman Dyson, but many other physicists and journalists with considerable training in physics have turned their attention to these kinds of speculations, with varying degrees of success.
Difficulties in assessing these cosmological speculations spring from two
principle sources, viz. (i) the mathematical and physical complexities of the
physical theories; and (li) the interpretative problems which arise once the
mathematical and physical details are fixed. For those unversed in differential geometry-and other relevant branches of mathematics--even the mere
precise formulation of the physical theories remains out of reach; yet for
those who have mastered the mathematics and physics, there remain
numerous subtle questions about the bearings of the physical evidence on
the resulting theories, and about the consequences of the theories for theological questions. It seems clear the professional philosophers should be
able to playa useful role in the assessment of the interpretative questionsand, in particular, that skills developed in the assessment of related problems in other areas should be transferable-but it is unclear what level of
mathematical and physical expertise is required.
Short of learning all of the relevant mathematics and physics, several
courses are open to philosophers. One possibility is to rely on the descriptive interpretations which physicists give of their theories in their popular
books. Another possibility is to further rely on the semi-technical descriptive interpretations which occur in the popular scientific journals: Science,
Nature, Scientific American, New Scientist, etc. A third possibility is to further
make use of the less theoretical scientific journals-e.g. the astrophysical
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journals-in which the relevant physical data is collected and described. A
fourth possibility is further to learn some of the relevant mathematics and
physics, e.g. via standard texts in the fields: introductions to differential
geometry and tensor analysis on manifolds, general relativity and gravitation, quantum mechanics, quantum electrodynamics, etc. And a fifth possibility is further to skim the technical physical journals with an eye to learning something from the descriptive pronouncements-about the assumptions required for, or the significance of, technical results-which occur in
these articles. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the adoption of
some or all of these techniques-perhaps in conjunction with discussion
with physicists and mathematicians-will enable philosophers to make a
useful contribution to the ongoing debate.
In Theism, Atheism And Big Bang Cosmology, William Lane Craig and
Quentin Smith-two philosophers who have pursued all of the strategies
just mentioned-daim to have begun philosophical debate about Big Bang
cosmology; and they hope that readers will leave the book with "an
increased appreciation of the profound issues involved in .. a theistic or
atheistic interpretation of Big Bang cosmology" (vii). I think that the debate
had already well and truly begun; but, as just noted, I agree with them that
there is room for philosophers to make an important contribution to an
appreciation of the issues involved. Whether their book makes the right
kind of contribution remains to be determined.
The book is composed mainly of previously published pieces-some
unchanged: Craig's "Theism And Big Bang Cosmology" (VIII) and '''What
Place, Then, For A Creator?': Hawking On God And Creation" (XI), and
Smith's "Infinity And The Past" (II); some abridged: an annotated excerpt
from Craig's The Kalam Cosmological Argument (I), Craig's "Time And
Infinity" (III), and Smith' s "Atheism, Theism And Big Bang Cosmology"
(VII); and some adapted and expanded: Craig's" A Criticism Of The
Cosmological Argument For God's Non-Existence" (X) and Smith's "The
Uncaused Beginning Of The Universe" (IV)-and pieces forthcoming at the
time of publication-Craig's "The Caused Beginning Of The Universe" (V)
(slightly altered when it appeared) and Smith's "Did The Big Bang Have A
Cause?" (VI). Apart from this, there are two unpublished articles by Smith:
"A Defence Of The Cosmological Argument For God's Non-Existence" (IX)
and "The Wave Function Of A Godless Universe" (XII). Given the cost of
the book and the accessibility of the prior publications, it seems to me that
this is not exactly value for money. Moreover, some of the previously published material would have benefitted from rewriting in the light of critical
comments from other authors and reviewers; in particular, the excerpt from
Craig's earlier book contains some quite weak arguments which could have
been deleted or replaced without detriment to the remainder of the book.
Finally, the utility of the book as a source of information about the physical
and mathematical details of the relevant physical theories is somewhat lessened by the fact that these details are scattered through the book, rather
than collected together in one place.
The material in the book is organised into three sections. The first section-about 56% of the book- presents and examines Craig's defence of
kalam cosmological arguments-i.e. arguments with the general form: (1)
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Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence; (2) The universe
began to exist; (hence) (3) The universe had a cause of its existence. The second section-about 26% of the book-presents and examines Smith's argument that theism is inconsistent with classical Big Bang cosmology. The
third section-about 18% of the book-examines the relative merits of
Stephen Hawking's quantum cosmology and theism. I shall briefly discuss
each section in tum.
(i)

The theistic cosmological argllment:

As is well-known, Craig has defended kalam cosmological arguments
with both a priori and II posteriori supporting arguments for the premise that
the universe began to exist. Craig arguments have been widely discussedthere is a partial list of references on p.92 of the book-and not all of Smith's
critical articles are included. Tshall focus my discussion upon the two main
points of contention between Craig and Smith, and then look at two important points upon which they agree.
(A) The first main point of contention between Craig and Smith----debated in II and III-concerns the a priori supporting arguments: on a priori
grounds, Craig denies that there can be physically instantiated infinities
formed by successive addition, and, indeed, that there can be physically
instantiated infinities at all; on similar grounds, Smith disagrees. Moreover,
Craig thinks that it is controversial whether there are any mathematical
infinities which are more than potentially infinite. Although Craig discusses
the right issues, and despite the fact that there is probably a coherent position for him to occupy, I don't think that anyone should be persuaded by
the superficial arguments which he gives (at pp.5-35 and pp.92-107). The
critical points which Smith makes seem to me almost all correct-indeed,
"Infinity And The Past" strikes me as the best essay in the collection-but
there are numerous other criticisms of Craig's discussion which I should
also want to make. For example, to mention just four:
(i) Craig claims that Realist interpretations of set theory are RULED OUT
by the set-theoretic paradoxes (pp.18-20) -and yet it is well-known that
many of those who have sought to provide new foundations for set theory
have been Realists, e.g. Quine and Maddy. Moreover, he simply ignores the
kinds of indispensibility arguments which have been the main tool in trade
of mathematical Realists in recent times. And he fails to address the question whether General Relativity and the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems-or some alternative theory of gravitation--could be reconstructed in
non-classical, e.g. intuitionistic, mathematics; if not, then there is some tension between his appeal to the attractions of intuitionism to bolster his a priori argument, and his appeal to the consequences of observations filtered
through the apparatus of classical mathematics, e.g. in calculations of the
critical density of the universe, to bolster his a posteriori argument.
(ii) Generalising the last worry raised, one might ask: if the view that the
past universe is temporally infinite is necessarily a priori false, how can
there be evidence which differentially supports the claim that the past universe is temporally finite? Won't anything count equally in favour of the
claim, and nothing against it? There seems to be a general strategic problem
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in mixing necessary a priori argument and contingent a posteriori evidence
when supporting a particular claim, at least ignoring secondary sources of
evidence such as testimony. Craig appears to think that his arguments
mutually support the premise that the universe began to exist (57); but on
current theories of evidential support with which I am acquainted-e.g.
Bayesian theories-that would not be the case. Perhaps there is a fix involving some kind of relevant entailment, but the matter is clearly not straightforward.
(iii) Craig claims that it is absurd to think that Relativity-STR and
GTR-supports a four-dimensionalist metaphysics (25)(294££.). He suggests
that there are three strategies which could be used to harmonise a 3D-metaphysics with Relativity, viz: (i) distinguish between metaphysical (A-theoretic) time and physical (B-theoretic) time; (ii) relativise becoming to reference-frames; or (iii) select a privileged reference frame-the cosmic time of
GTR-to define objective becoming. (95) But at least two of these strategies
are dubious: there is no a priori guarantee that a cosmic time can be defined
for the universe', nor that there is any other privileged reference frame
which could serve as a suitable replacement; and the relativisation of
becoming to reference frames entails a relativisation of existence to reference frames, which-given the local nature of frames of reference in GTRstrongly suggests that things like existent mass-ener/)>y will not be conserved
quantities. Moreover, the third strategy-with its proliferation of ideology-is a concession to 4D-ism: if the views were equal in all other respects,
then here would be a reason to prefer 4D-ism. At the very least, much more
needs to be said to show that Relativity-STR and GTR--:ioes not support
4D-ism.
(iv) Craig's views about space and infinity are hard to clarify. I think his
view must be the following: (i) finite volumes of space are only potentially
infinitely divisible; and (ii) one cannot tell a priori whether the whole of
space is strictly finite or rather potentially infinite, since one cannot tell a priori whether or not space is (always) expanding. However, I am not sure: this
is one of many points which could have been clarified by a rewrite of (I).
(B) The second main point of contention between Craig and Smithdebated in IV, V and VI-concerns the question of whether the Big Bang
requires a cause. Craig holds that it is a kind of "metaphysical first principle" that everything which comes to be has a cause of its coming to be (156);
whereas Smith holds that "it is probably true that either the universe began
without cause at the beginning of the current expansion, either (1) subsequent to a singularity of infinite density, temperature and curvature, and
zero radius, or (2) at a singularity with finite and non-zero values, or (3) in a
vacuum fluctuation from a larger space or a tunnelling from nothing, or the
universe spontaneously began to exist at the beginning of some prior
expansion phase under conditions described in (1), (2), or (3)" (129). I think
there is room to disagree with both authors 2; I also think that their discussion proceeds with insufficient attention to the different things which one
might mean by "cause". In particular, the discussion of whether virtual particles appear uncaused in the quantum-mechanical vacuum is marred by a
failure to distinguish between material and efficient causes, and more generally by the absence of any serious discussion of the connections between
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physically necessary conditions and causes.' A further problem, in evidence in Craig's writing, is the tendency to use slogans-such as "nothing
comes from nothing" -as rhetorical substitutes for arguments, e.g. against
the view that there could be things which come to be despite the absence of
any prior physically necessary or physically sufficient conditions for their
coming to be.
(C) Craig and Smith agree that the scientific evidence strongly supports
the claim that the universe is temporally finite, and that the Big Bang singularity-or some suitable quantum gravitational replacement-marks the
temporal origin of the universe:
(a) Craig presents a very useful, albeit now somewhat dated4, account of
much of the astronomical observational evidence which is alleged to support the claims that the universe is expanding (red-shift of distant galaxies),
that it expanded from a hot, dense more-or-less singular state (background
microwave radiation, abundance of deuterium and helium), and that it will
continue to expand forever (average density of matter). I think that he occasionally slips up: for example, he says that "a neutrino is a stable atomic
particle that has no charge and zero mass when at rest (which it never is,
since it is travelling at the speed of light as long as it exists)" (40)-but,
while it is true that there is no rest frame for neutrinoss, it is just not the case
that the rest mass of particles which travel with luminal velocity is defined
to be the mass which they (would) have when at resU More importantly, he
sometimes draws conclusions which are not warranted by the evidence: e.g.
from the claim that the universe will not stop expanding, he concludes that
"creation" happened only once (76, quoting Sandage and Tammann); but, if
Wheeler is right that laws and constants could be reprocessed probabilistically during the bounces of an oscillating universe, then other bounces
remain an open possibility.
(b) Smith presents a useful account of some of the theoretical considerations which are alleged to support the claim that the universe began from
something like an initial singularity-e.g. the Hawking-Penrose theoremstogether with some more impressionistic details about the underlying
mathematics and physics. Again, I think that he sometimes slips up. For
example, in his discussion of infinitely old oscillating universes, he writes:
"Smith and Weingard allude to a possibility I have not considered .. ,. [They]
do not elaborate on which model they have in mind, but [their discussion]
brings to mind the de Sitter model of the universe." (131) In fact, I am sure
that Smith and Weingard must have been adverting to a Robertson-Walker
solution discussed on p.139 of Hawking and Ellis? As Hawking and Ellis
point out, the solution in question does seem to be in conflict with observational evidence, so this oversight doesn't upset Smith's argument against
oscillating universes.
Smith is much more enthusiastic than Craig about recent scientific speculation about the early stages of the universe, e.g. inflationary scenarios,
grand unified theories, supersymmetry, vacuum fluctuation models, creation of dark matter, etc. As Craig rightly points out, there is as yet little or
no evidence which supports these hypotheses; and the non-technical explanations which physicists give of their content often seems to be confusede.g., proponents of vacuum fluctuation models often seem to get into trou-
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ble with claims about the evolution of the universe from literally nothing
when they mean evolution from a pre-existing vacuum." However, it is also
the case that we are very far from having a complete account of the early
stages of the universe---€.g. we don't yet have a consistent story about the
evolution of stars, galaxies, clusters and superclusters--so the same kind of
methodological caution suggests that there is room for scepticism about the
standard Big Bang model and the idea that the universe began from something like an initial singularity. Even now, it is not inconceivable-though it
is, I grant, unlikely-that some kind of steady state theory might turn out to
accord better with the evidence. But then it seems to me that, at the very
least, a pro tem agnosticism about the temporal origins of the universe-and
hence about further inferences to supernatural causes etc.-is an entirely
respectable position.
(D) Craig and Smith also agree in rejecting tenseless, four-dimensionalist
accounts of time, a topic which each has discussed in other publications;
this allows Craig to make some good criticisms of Smith's endorsement of
physical models which appear to rely on four-dimensionalism. (153, 158f.,
259, 271) However, I doubt very much that there are any knockdown objections to 40-ism; and, in particular, I doubt that there is any good reason to
think that 40-ers are, ipso facto, irrational. But so much of Craig's argumententation-both a priori and a posteriori-relies on the premise that 40ism is false that it is hard to see what the point of insisting on his arguments
could be. More generally, it is clear that Craig's arguments require numerous controversial metaphysical assumptions which are at best given only
slight support: so what point are they supposed to serve? Neither Craig nor
Smith pays any attention to these fundamental kinds of questions, to the
detriment of the arguments of each, I think!
(ii) The atheistic cosmological argument:

Smith's atheistic cosmological argument goes as follows:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)
(7)

If God exists and there is an earliest state E of the universe, then God
created E.
If God created E, then E is ensured either to contain animate creatures or to lead to subsequent state of the universe that contains animate creatures.
There is an earliest state of the universe and it is the Big Bang singularity.
The earliest state of the universe is inanimate since the singularity
involves the life-hostile conditions of infinite temperature, infinite
density and infinite curvature.
The Big Bang singularity is inhererently unpredictable and lawless
and consequently there is no guarantee that it will emit a maximal
cor:figuration of particles that will evolve into an animate state of the
uruverse.
(Hence) God could not have created the earliest state of the universe.
(From 2, 3, 5, 6)
(Hence) God does not exist. (From I, 6)
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Among the objections which Craig and Smith debate-in VII, VIII, IX, and
X-there are the following: (i) it is not clear that God is required to create an
animate universe; (ii) it is not clear that God cannot intervene to ensure an
animate universe; (iii) it is not clear that the Big Bang singularity is realperhaps it is merely a theoretical fiction; (iv) it is not clear that unpredictability entails absence of divine knowlege, since God might have middle
knowledge; and (v) it is not clear whether the theistic hypothesis is more
simple than the atheistic alternative. No doubt, this list of objections is
incomplete. I think that Craig has much the better of this part of the debate,
though sometimes his arguments could be improved upon. There do seem
to be lots of ways of reconciling the existence of God with Big Bang cosmology; see Duncan MacIntosh (1994) "Could God Have Made The Big Bang?"
Dialogue 33, pp.3-20 for some suggestions.
Craig's argument about the status of the initial singularity is curious. He
claims that "the metaphysician is rational in interpreting the ontological status of the singularity as nothingness" (225), by supposing that "the temporal series is like a series of fractions converging to 0 as a limit: 1/2, 1/4, 1/8,
.... , 0" (224). While I agree that this is an excellent suggestion, it seems to
contradict Craig's own claims about the impossibility of physically instantiated infinities. Moreover, it suggests a further possibility which was overlooked in the discussion of causes for the Big Bang: viz. that the series of
caused events is also like the given series of fractions, and (hence?) not in
need of any external cause. At the very least, talk about "objects popping
into existence from nothing", etc. would seem to be quite inappropriate on
this picture, since every event-including every event which involves an
object coming into existence-is caused by an earlier event.
(iii)

Hawking's cosmology:

Stephen Hawking's models for the universe provide the subject matter
for the third major topic of debate (XI and XII). Craig alleges that the early
Hawking-Hartle model is conceptually flawed in several respects, and, in
particular, that it incurs various absurdly extravagant metaphyscial commitments. On the other hand, Smith claims that this and subsequent models
admit of a more modest "quasi-instrumentalist" interpretation, with none
of the ven; extravagant commitments which Craig deplores; more exactly,
Smith defends the following three theses: (i) a "quasi-instrumentalist" interpretation of Hawking's cosmological model is physically intelligible; Oi)
Hawking's cosmological model is inconsistent with theism; and (iii)
Hawking's cosmological model is explanatarily superior to theism.
One important point of contention between Craig and Smith concerns
the consequences of the use of: a many worlds, or consistent histories, interpretation of quantum mechanics; Feynman's technique of summing over
histories; and a Euclidean configuration space, or superspace, in which time
is imaginary. As Smith emphasises in the excellent second, third, and fourth
sections of his essay, we need not agree with Hawking about what is
required for a realistic interpretation of his theory-indeed, we may well be
mislead by Hawking's speculations about the commitments entailed by
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acceptance of his theoriO-but should look for ourselves at the technical
details. Unfortunately, those details are so forbidding that it is hard for a
non-specialist like me to tell whether the suggestions which Smith offers are
plausible.
One point which clearly requires attention is the claim that "one can
interpret the functional integral over all compact four-geometries bounded
by a given three-geometry as giving the amplitude for that three-geometry
to arise .. from nothing". (313) What notion of probability is required for the
claim that a certain wave function gives the (probability) amplitude for "the
universe to arise from literally nothing" (313)? Should we conclude on this
basis that there are almost certainly countless universes with the same
geometry which also arose from nothing, not to mention myriads of universes with alternative geometries? These points are important for
Smith's-prima facie quite implausible-arguments for the inconsistency of
theism with Hawking's models. I strongly suspect that, on any decent
account of probability, it is simply unintelligible to speak of the probability of
a given three-geometry arising from nothing; at the very least, there is room
here for elaboration and clarification.
To conclude: I think that Craig and Smith should be commended for
their recognition of the need for serious philosophical investigation of physical theories about the origins of the universe, and for their willingness to do
some of the digging in the physics literature which such investigation
requires. Much of the work to which they refer is essential reading for others who wish to work in the field. On the other hand, I do not think that the
decision to reprint previously published essays was correct; most of the
essays are neither so good nor so hard to obtain as to call for re-publication
and, in any case, the end result is far too disjointed and piecemeal to be of
much use to readers seeking a point of entry to the field. What is really
needed is a much more systematic examination of the bearing of recent
philosophical work-analyses of infinity, analyses of time, analyses of causation, analyses of mathematics, analyses of the ontological status of scientific theories, analyses of probability, analyses of reasoned belief revision,
analyses of the content of theological theories, etc.--Dn the interpretation of
those physical theories. Moreover, the physical theories themselves-and
the evidence for them-also need to be presented more systematically. Of
course, to do all this would be a Herculean task: but it seems to me that a
book which falls so far short is of only dubious value.
NOTES
1.
Or, at least, it is controversial that there is such an a priori guarantee.
The argument of Hawking, S. (1968) "The existence of cosmic time functions"
Proc. Roy. Soc. A 308, pp.433-435 seems to show that a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of cosmic time functions in any spacetime is the
absence of closed time-like and null curves, i.e. roughly, the absence of causal
loops. Some hold that causal loops are a priori impossible; but the matter is controversial.
2.
In particular, I think that the hypothesis of a temporally finite but
beginingless universe-on analogy with a finite but open line segment-has
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much to recommend it; if there is no first state of the universe, then it is far from
clear that it is correct to say that it began, even if it is also temporally finite.
However, I also see no good reason to think that everything which comes to be
has a cause of its coming to be.
3.
Smith outlines a probabilitistic account of causation at pp.180-181; but
it is subject to counter-example by well-known cases of pre-emption (Menzies)
and double prevention (Hall).
4.
The annotations to essay I-pp.67-76-update the 1979 text. I suspect
that Craig's discussion of the post-1979 literature exhibits certain kinds of biases; e.g. I find it tempting to think that Craig's keemless to have the density parameter turn out to be less than one leads him to ignore the reasons which many
cosmologists have for thinking that the density parameter must be almost exactly one. More generally, I think that he lays too much stress on current failures to
detect postulated particles and structures: dark matter, monopoles, superstrings, etc.; it is, after all, deficiencies in the standard models which lead most
cosmologists and particle physicists to be interested in the search for such
things. On the other hand, there is clearly good reason to be cautious about
these kinds of speculations.
5.
At least if neutrinos do have zero rest mass; this question has been controversial of late.
6.
See, e.g., Rindler, W. (1969) Essential Reilltivity New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhardt Company, Chapter 5, esp. p.116: "A single photon certainly
does not [have a CM frameY'.
7.
The Large-Scale Structure Of Space- Time Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973
8.
On the other hand, Craig himself is involved in a similar confusion
when he claims that a condition of "infinite density" is precisely equivalent to
"nothing" (43).
9.
r have made this kind of criticism of Craig elsewhere; see my "Reply
To Professor Craig", Sophia, forthcoming.
10. Smith makes a good case for the view that Craig is thus mislead. Also,
inter Illia, he strongly suggests that my own claims about how to re-interpret
Hawking's model-in "Professor William Craig's Criticisms Of Critiques Of
K111am Cosmological Arguments By Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking And Adolf
Grunbaum", forthcoming in Faith And Philosophy-are similarly confused: if
"superspace" is a configuration space, then it is simply wrong to identify it with
a physical space.

Scripture in the Thought of Seren Kierkegaard, by L. Joseph Rosas, III.
Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1994. Pp. 219.
STEPHEN N. DUNNING, University of Pennsylvania.
I welcome the opportunity to review Scripture in the Thought of Seren
Kierkegaard for Faith and Philosophy, for there is no better journal in which to
call attention to the need to pursue this neglected aspect of Kierkegaard
studies. Although the book is seriously flawed, it does deal with an issue
that is very important, and Dr. Rosas makes several contributions that will
be helpful to future scholarship.
Interpretations of the so-called "father of existentialism" have too often
been limited to one of four trajectories: many have examined some of

